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The Theory of Guerrilla Warfare 
The acceptance of guerrilla warfare as 'sui generis' can be traced to the 
remarkable use by Mao's Communist Party of guerrilla tactics to wrestle power 
from the Kuomintang and impose on China a new socio-political structure. 
Hitherto, guerrilla warfare was treated in theoretical writings on war and 
strategy as mere adjuncts of conventional warfare. In pre-Mao writings on small 
wars, guerrilla warfare was perceived as standing no chance of success when 
fought independently of regular warfare. As Laqueur reported, Jomini, the 
famous French military thinker of the nineteenth century, saw no prospect of 
success for wars fought by partisans alone: "popular uprising without the 
support of a disciplined and regular army would always be suppressed".1 
It is not surprising, therefore, that writings relating to guerrilla tactics were, 
for the most part, concerned with the amount of scope to be given to small 
roving bands of irregular soldiers or partisans in a war or wars involving engage-
ments between massed armies. The use of guerrilla tactics was also, signifi-
cantly, thought appropriate only for small units of professional soldiers operat-
ing to undermine the enemy's war capabilities by selective acts of sabotage or 
for bands of partisans, that is, civilians committed to the defence of their values, 
institutions or beliefs. 
Paradoxically, Karl Marx and Engels, whose works have formed the legiti-
mising creed of nearly all of the major guerrilla movements in the 20th century 
and have become essential reading for guerrilla activists, shared the general 
scepticism about the utility of guerrilla action, although for different reasons. 
For Marx, guerrilla training and practices were ill-suited to the attainment of 
the discipline and uniformity of purpose essential for a successful revolution. 
Guerrillas, having been conditioned to free-roving habits, looting and revenge 
raids were likely to transform, in peace time, into thugs and lawless bands which 
can be easily attracted to banditry, intimidation, blackmail and such other 
lawless acts which are bound to defeat the purpose of a revolution — the libera-
tion of oppressed peoples from domination and exploitation.2 
Although Engels was less sanguine than Marx in his assessment of the utility 
of guerrilla tactics, he was, nonetheless circumspect in his estimation of its 
value. Engels believed that guerrilla war was essential for bringing about 
revolutionary change for he saw guerrilla warfare as the only means by which a 
small or weak people can defeat a bigger or more powerful people. Engels, 
however, believed that there was very little prospect of success for guerrilla 
warfare in Europe, his reason being that "the fanaticism and national 
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enthusiasm" needed for a sustained programme of guerrilla action are not 
customarily exhibited by "civilized people". Besides, Europe with its developed 
interior, well-spread urban connurbations and efficient communication systems 
offered little or none of the inaccessible terrain which guerrillas require as 
sanctuaries. Guerrilla warfare was, consequently, in Engel's view best suited for 
those areas of the world in which the terrain, the forest and jungle offer excellent 
sanctuaries to guerrilla fighters. As far as the European theatre was concerned, 
Engels shared the popular view that guerrilla tactics could only be meaningfully 
employed in conjunction with the action of regular forces.3 
Although Engels perceived guerrilla warfare as a veritable instrument of 
revolution and social change in those areas which offer excellent sanctuaries to 
guerrilla fighters, in the form of large expanses of jungle and inaccessible 
terrain, he was rather sceptical about the prospects of guerrilla warfare in these 
"backwaters" of the world. His scepticism was informed by the total absence in 
these areas of an industrial proletariat which, in the Marx-Engels dynamics of 
revolutionary process, only can provide the leadership and organizational 
opportunities required for a successful revolution. The abundance of a placid 
and traditionally conservative peasantry did not, in Engels' view, provide the 
best context for generating revolutionary zeal and prosecuting a guerrilla war 
against an oppressive and exploitative ruling class. 
The history of guerrilla warfare since the second world war has had the 
paradoxical consequence of proving pre-Mao assessments of the relative utility 
of guerrilla warfare both right and wrong. It has shown quite clearly that in the 
European theatre, from which the factual framework for the evaluation of 
guerrilla warfare in pre-Mao writings was derived, guerrilla warfare has very 
limited utility. The general disposition of the civil population to accept the rule 
of law, the democratization of affluence,4 the efficiency of communicative 
systems, the existence and efficacy of complex and highly developed intelligence 
networks, the presence of well-organized, well-armed and adaptable armed 
services, and the de-ruralization of the interior have combined with other factors 
to rob the guerrilla activist in Europe and North America of both the physical 
and popular support which are crucial to his survival and the success of his 
mission. The experience of the Basque separatists of Spain, the Red Army 
Faction of Germany (better known as the Baader-Meinhof Group), the Red 
Brigades of Italy, the Quebec Liberation Front of Canada and various groups 
in the United States of America have shown that in the developed parts of the 
world the value of guerrilla activities resides in keeping issues alive rather than 
in effecting the restructuring of society which most guerrilla movements see as 
their primary objective. Carlos Marighella's urban slums5 are yet to prove 
impregnable and resilient enough in these parts of the world to provide the 
sanctuary in which urban guerrillas could weather the sustained and superior 
counter-attacks of the forces of the establishment and move on from a state of 
strategic defensive or tactical defence to that of strategic offensive. 
In Asia, Latin America and Africa the gap between pre-Mao theories of 
guerrilla warfare and practice has been considerably wide. The victories of the 
Communist Party in China, the Fidelistas in Cuba, the Viet Cong in Vietnam 
through the success of liberation movements in Southern Africa to the triumph 
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of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua have repeatedly undermined the general premise 
that guerrilla warfare can only be meaningfully prosecuted within a war or wars 
involving regular armies. Rather than being a dependent variable in the context 
of conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare has in the last three and a half 
decades become a major instrument of structural change outside the 
geographical reaches of the NATO and Warsaw Pact sub-systems. 
The credit for extending the role of guerrilla warfare in political and social 
change and establishing it as a unique and comprehensive mode of warfare goes 
to Mao Tse Tung and the Communist Party of China. Under Mao's leadership 
the Communist Party shifted from the orthodox Marxist-Leninist dependence 
on the urban proletariat and the strategy of attaining political power and 
structural changes in socio-economic relations through urban uprisings and 
popular revolt to a policy of retreat (tactical mutation) from the urban centres to 
the rural areas and reliance on the peasantry. Consequently, Mao and his men 
acquired, between 1927 and 1934, bases in various parts of Central China and 
sought to mobilize the peasantry against the oppressive feudal system in which 
they lived. Mao, indeed, considered the peasantry as appropriate instruments 
for revolutionary change principally because of their large numbers; but the 
all-powerful tide of peasantry which he predicted would sweep away the 
exploitative feudal system in China failed to materialize in the 1930s. 
However, Mao's faith in the usefulness of the peasantry did not diminish nor 
did circumstances enable him and the Communist Party to dispense with the 
support of the peasantry. Between 1933-34 the Communist policy of fighting an 
"open war" against the Kuomintang was clearly shown to be unwise for the 
Communists were defeated in successive battles. The Kuomintang decimated 
their numbers and alienated their support by evacuating the rural population in 
large numbers and training a vast army of anti-Communist militias. 
Consequently the Communists were forced to move their army and the core of 
their support to a safer part of China, hence the legendary Long March in 
which about one hundred thousand men and women embarked on a journey 
from the South-West of China to the Northern Province of Shensi. 
The remote, barren and inaccessible terrain of Shensi provided for Mao and 
his men a safe base from which they built up a formidable army and expanded 
the Communist Party's political base. In these tasks they were helped by the 
Japanese invasion of China. The Communist Party identified itself with the 
nationalistic fervour and general antipathy against the Japanese and, indeed, 
signed an agreement with the Kuomintang to co-operate in expelling the 
Japanese from Chinese soil. But while the KMT dissipated its resources on 
fighting the Japanese, the Communist Party steadily built up its forces and 
support as well as expanding the area under its control in preparation for the 
confrontation with the Kuomintang which they as well as the KMT knew would 
eventually come. Mao perceived the Japanese invasion as a transitory stage in 
Chinese history for he saw no prospect for Japanese imperialism. Japan was, in 
his view, simply too small to impose its hegemony successfully on China and all 
of South-East Asia and cope with British, American and Russian military power 
at the same time. 
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While the Japanese invasion gave the Communist Party the opportunity to 
consolidate its gains and demonstrate its administrative and political skills in the 
areas in which it controlled, it exposed the inadequacies and decadence of the 
Kuomintang's administrative and military machineries. Thus, when the 
confrontation finally came, after the Japanese surrender, the Communist Party 
had established itself as a better alternative to the KMT. In the civil war, Mao 
and his men dug themselves into the countryside in readiness for a protracted 
war. The Communist Party gradually gained control of the rural areas and the 
support of the rural population. The KMT retreated and concentrated their 
forces in the urban centres where they were gradually surrounded and 
systematically overpowered by Mao's revolutionary army. The revolutionary 
tide of peasantry which had failed to evolve in the '30s finally sprung into life 
and swept away the KMT from power in China. 
The success of the Communist Party in China undermined some assump-
tions about the nature and utility of guerrilla warfare. In the first place it 
showed that guerrilla warfare can have a life of its own and be used independ-
ently to attain specific political/socio-economic objectives. Mao and his men 
conducted their struggle first against the Japanese and then against the Kuomin-
tang mostly through guerrilla tactics particularly after the failure of the policy 
of "open war" against the KMT. The Red Army was only progressively trans-
formed into regular formations in the final stages of the civil war when it became 
necessary to meet the enemy on his own territory — the urban centres — and 
demolish his last resistance in a decisive way. The transformation of the Red 
Army from a guerrilla force into a regular army later formed the basis of Mao's 
prescription that all guerrilla armies must be transformed into regular armies in 
the final stages of the revolution not only for the purposes of eliminating the 
enemy in a final and decisive assault but also for the purposes of preparing the 
ground for effective control of the state after a successful revolution.6 
The transformation of the Red Army into a regular army demonstrated that 
guerrilla bands can be organized and managed in the post-revolution period in 
such a way that the tendency towards individualism and lawlessness which Marx 
saw as a major flaw in the use of guerrilla warfare for revolutionary purposes is, 
for the most part, eliminated or effectively controlled. 
Besides, the success of Mao and the Communist Party in China showed that 
the peasantry can be mobilized for revolution. Although it is true, following 
Marx, that peasants being generally gullible and conservative are usually 
resistant to change, the experience of China's revolution pointed to the 
possibility of harnessing the stability, sturdiness and the numerical strength of 
the peasantry for revolutionary change. 
Finally, the revolution in China showed, in contradiction to Engels' assess-
ment, that people outside the "civilized world" — in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America — were capable of taking advantages which their environment offered 
to overthrow oppressive and unwanted socio-economic structures. This has been 
demonstrated in Cuba, in Vietnam, in Algeria, in Portuguese Africa and more 
recently in Nicaragua. 
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Guerrilla Warfare in Africa 
The African continent has proved a very fertile ground for guerrilla warfare. 
There have been no less than ten attempts, since the second world war, to force 
political or socio-economic changes in various parts of Africa through guerrilla 
warfare. The attraction of guerrilla warfare to African liberation and nationalist 
movements is not altogether surprising. Most of Africa offers excellent 
sanctuaries — either in the form of inhospitable desert or inaccessible jungle — 
to guerrilla fighters. The demographic distribution of population and the pattern 
of development in Africa also favour the guerrilla activist. With most of the 
population of Africa residing in primitive rural conditions the guerrilla is 
presented with both a deprived, alienated population and a deprived environ-
ment, both of which are excellent conditions for revolution. 
There is, indeed, a general acceptance on the African sub-continent of the 
selective utility of guerrilla war as a means for achieving political and socio-
economic changes. This acceptance is institutionalized in the African Liberation 
Committee of the Organization of African Unity, a committee charged with the 
duty of co-ordinating and supporting revolutionary wars directed against 
colonial powers and white-dominated minority regimes on the African 
continent. 
It must be pointed out that the acceptance of the idea of guerrilla war in the 
highest levels of African politics is much less the result of mere enchantment 
with and admiration for the ideas and successes of men like Mao Tse Tung, Vo 
Giap or Che Guevara than it is of the failure of non-violent means in the 
attempt to achieve desired political and socio-economic changes in some parts of 
Africa. Put differently, the setting up of the "African Liberation Committee" 
in 1963 meant the rejection of Gandhi's idea of passive resistance7 which had 
dominated the thinking of African nationalists in the forties, fifties and early 
sixties in favour of Frantz Fanon's call for revolutionary violence." The presence 
of an intransigient colonial power (Portugal) and the existence of defiant white 
minority regimes (South Africa; Rhodesia) were the obvious catalysts for such 
a conversion. 
This is by no means to suggest that guerrilla struggle only began in 
sub-Saharan Africa with the establishment of the African Liberation Commit-
tee. On the contrary, as early as 1952 the Kikuyu tribe of Kenya in East Africa 
had found in guerrilla war a very useful weapon for ending British colonial 
rule in Kenya and for creating a political vacuum which they sought to fill. The 
"Mau Mau" Movement as the Kikuyu rebellion came to be known dented the 
myth of the invincibility of the colonial military machinery and pointed to the 
possibility of achieving political change in Black Africa through violence. But 
rapid decolonization in the late fifties and early sixties meant that the great 
majority of sub-Saharan colonies did not have the need nor the opportunity to 
follow the example of Kenya. 
If the Mau Mau movement in Kenya was the first dramatization of guerrilla 
war in sub-Saharan Africa it was also the least sophisticated, in ideological 
terms that is, of such wars. It was fought for very limited objectives; simply, the 
replacement of a British-controlled political structure with that of a Kikuyu-
controlled structure; it was, in other words, a war to change the materials which 
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made up the structure rather than the structure itself. Hence the "Mau Mau" 
movement was more in the tradition of inter-tribal competition for control of 
distributive power (political power). The movement's strategy was, conse-
quently, very simple; it was to kill as many of the settlers as would not only 
make continued settlement in Kenya a dangerous gamble but also create 
antipathy, in the Mother country, towards continued imperial relations with 
Kenya. Besides, the locus of recruitment of fighting men was primordial; the 
Mau Mau Movement was essentially a Kikuyu Movement hence the Kikuyu, 
awakened to the chance of pre-eminence in post-colonial Kenya, provided the 
support and sanctuary as well as the fighting men for the movement. "Mau 
Mau" recruiters administered an "oath of unity" based upon Kikuyu solidarity 
and demanding strict secrecy and total commitment.9 
Although it can be suggested that the "Mau Mau" rebellion was inspired by 
the example of Mao Tse Tung in China, it is doubtful whether Mao's thoughts 
had any significant influence on the organization and mode of operation of the 
movement. Any manifestation of Mao's prescriptions in the operation of the 
movement, such as reliance on the peasantry (Kikuyu peasants, for the most 
part) and the use of sanctuaries (remote Kikuyu villages), must have come 
through accidental approximation rather than design. This cannot be said for 
the subsequent guerrilla struggles which the sub-continent has witnessed or is 
currently witnessing. 
The many guerrilla struggles that have taken or are taking place in Africa can 
be classified into four main categories. The first category is that with which the 
"Mau Mau" movement in Kenya has already been identified, that is, Wars 
against colonial Powers. This specie of guerrilla war has been the most 
successful on the African continent as witnessed by the dramatic victories of 
revolutionary movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau against a 
Portugal reluctant to relinquish its Imperial status. The second category 
embraces Wars against white-dominated minority regimes: this is the specie of 
guerrilla war which currently pre-occupies the African Liberation Committee 
and such wars have been or are being fought out in Rhodesia and in Namibia 
(South West Africa). The third category may be described as Wars for National 
self-determination: this specie of guerrilla war has been dramatized in Southern 
Sudan and is currently being fought out in Eritrea (Ethiopia). The fourth and 
last category encompasses Wars to overthrow Indigenous governments or 
Indigenously-controlled socio-economic or political structures; the Republic of 
Chad, Zaire and Angola are the three most obvious arenas where this kind of 
guerrilla war has been or is being dramatized. It is possible to reduce the 
categories to two in which case the variant which has been described above as 
wars against white-dominated minority regimes may be subsumed under the 
category of Wars against colonial Powers. In the same way, the variant which 
we describe as Wars for National self-determination may be included in the 
category of Wars to overthrow Indigenous Governments or Indigenously-
controlled socio-economic/political structures. 
Wars in these two categories have common antecedents in the colonial history 
of Africa and borrow considerably from the pool of guerrilla experience, tactics 
and doctrine. However, there is a noticeable disparity in the pattern of results 
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attending wars in the two categories. Whereas, Wars against colonial Powers 
have been attended by almost total success, the efforts of revolutionary and 
nationalist groups to enforce new political arrangements or overthrow existing 
socio-economic structures have met with little or no success. 
The Pattern of Resistance to Indigenous Governments 
The various wars which emanate from attempts by groups to alter existing 
political arrangements in. Africa and create new states, as in Eritrea, or over-
throw indigenous governments in pursuit of a new vision of socio-political order 
have certain features in common: 
1 they have tended to occur in multi-ethnic or multi-racial states; 
2 they have tended to occur in states where race or tribe is a major instru-
ment in the control and distribution of political and economic power as well as a 
decisive element in the exclusion of certain groups from the economic and 
political process; 
3 these wars have tended to represent the attempts by a racial or ethnic 
group to alter what is perceived as the monopoly of political and economic 
power by another racial or ethnic group; 
4 these wars have generally been motivated by primarily nationalistic as 
distinguished from revolutionary objectives. 
These general propositions are more or less true of the sixteen-year civil war 
in the Sudan, the Eritrean War of Seccession in Ethiopia, the Civil War in 
Chad, the invasions of Zaire and the guerrilla war being waged by UN ITA 
against the MPLA-controlled government of Angola. 
In the Sudan, Eritrea and Chad racial differences have combined with 
cultural and religious differences to produce disaffection and violent revolt 
against the state whilst in Zaire and Angola tribalism is the principal source of 
political instability and insurrection. In the Sudan the domination of political 
and economic power by the North and its Arabic elements and the exclusion of 
the Negroid population of the three Southern provinces prepared the grounds 
for communal distrust and the outbreak of civil violence in 1955."' The revolt in 
the South which lasted for sixteen years represented the rejection of the struc-
ture of power and privileges in the Sudan by the South and the attempt to 
redress the imbalance inherent in this structure. Significantly, the civil war in 
Chad was catalysed by the same phenomenon with the exception that the 
imbalance in the structure of power and privileges was in favour of the Negroid 
South. The Negroid tribes of Southern Chad by virtue of their education and 
assimilation of French culture dominated the apparatus of state power and the 
economy much to the exclusion of the larger Nilotic tribes of the Sahel and 
Tibesti Mountains with their Arabic antecedents and Islamic orientation. In 
Ethiopia, as well, racism and religion have been potent factors in social 
disequilibrium and communal violence. The Eritreans with their claim to Arabic 
antecedents and their Islamic religion have been ill at ease in an Ethiopia whose 
political and economic institutions are dominated by Christians of the Coptic 
faith. 
In Zaire and Angola the pattern of tribal or racial domination and exclusion 
is not so clear-cut. In Zaire, Mobutu's reliance on men from his home province 
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of Equateur and the formidable presence of elements from this province in the 
bureaucracy and the business circle have given rise to resentment on the part of 
other tribes. It is doubtful, however, whether there has been an organised and 
systematic attempt to exlude men from other tribes from political power and the 
economy as Albert Ndele, a former Governor of Zaire's Central Bank, would 
like the world to believe: 
"Men from Kasai, Katanga and Bakongo have been systematically put 
aside in the new state system, systematically deprived of positions and 
maltreated. Young officers, even those trained overseas, come back to find 
that if they are not from Equateur there is no possibility of advancement. 
The most influential people in the administration are now also from this 
region . . . Beyond that the whole of commerce, at least in consumer 
goods, is in the hands of the President's own family. What Mobutu has 
done is to tribalise and régionalise all the key posts in public admin-
istration."" 
The presence of men like Karl i Bond in the top hierarchy of power and of 
Ndele himself before his disenchantment and retreat from Zaire suggests a 
conscious, if not successful, attempt to encourage national representation in the 
hierarchy of political, bureaucratic and economic power. This is by no means to 
suggest that tribalism is not an important element in the calculus of power in 
Zaire. The suggestion here is that Zaire's problems cannot be explained simply 
in terms of the resentment on the part of other tribal groups at the dominance of 
the President's tribesmen in the economy and the apparatus of state power. 
Tribalism in the absence of nationally accepted channels for articulating 
interests remains the most important form of social organisation in Zaire and 
the most important source of social disequilibrium. The invasions of Shaba 
province in 1977 and 1978 represent this articulation of interests through tribal 
groupings. 
In Angola, UNITA's continuing guerrilla war against the force of the 
MPLA-controlled government is motivated by both the reluctance of UNITA 
to accept the sovereignty of the MPLA-controlled state over the largest ethnic 
group in Angola — the Ovimbundu — which it represents and from which it 
draws its support, as well as the desire to enforce Ovimbundu participation, on 
equal terms with other tribal groups (the Bakongo and the Mbundu), in the 
political and economic processes in Angola. 
The Roots of Failure 
Whatever their causes and tactics guerrilla groups have not been too success-
ful in altering the structure of power in indigenously controlled systems. The 
reason for this general lack of success lies basically in the factor of racism and 
tribalism. The success of guerrilla or nationalist groups in uprooting colonial 
regimes derives essentially not from actual military defeats but in psychological 
victory over the Imperial power. Most colonial wars have ended in favour of the 
nationalist movements principally because the nationalists succeeded in making 
the territory in dispute "too unprofitable and politically difficult for the colonial 
power".12 In the case of indigenous regimes there is little prospect for such a 
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psychological victory because the regime or the tribe which it represents is often 
psychologically committed to the territory in dispute. The race or tribe under 
siege often has nowhere to go and must fight to the bitter end. In Chad, where 
the forces of Goukoni Waddaye and Hissen Habré succeeded in forcing Felix 
Malloum to hand over power, their achievement was due essentially to the 
collapse of Malloum's military support rather than any attenuation in the 
psychological resolve of Malloum and the tribal groupings whose interests he 
represented and protected. 
Another major factor responsible for the relative lack of success of guerrilla 
wars directed against indigenous governments is that in Africa the advantage is 
always on the side of incumbent governments. The Charter of the Organisation 
of African Unity disavows interference in the internal affairs of fellow member 
states. Consequently, the African Liberation Committee has no place within its 
statutory responsibilites for revolutionary or nationalist movements aiming to 
overthrow African regimes, however morally justified their case may be. This 
reluctance on the part of African states to get involved in domestic wars in 
African states has tended to detract from the legitimacy of insurrectionist move-
ments. Indeed, the OAU is more often inclined to encourage national reconcilia-
tion with its implication of restoring the status quo which the insurrectionists 
would like to overthrow in the first place. 
African apathy to domestic insurrections has also tended to affect the volume 
and intensity of external support for insurrectionist movements. The big powers 
have generally been reluctant to give overt support to anti-government forces. 
More often than not, the incumbent governments have been more successful in 
attracting foreign support in the proportion required to swing the balance of war 
in their favour. The Government of Sudan at one time or another received 
support from the Soviet Union and the United States in its efforts to suppress 
the insurrection in the South. In Ethiopia, American support for Haile Sellas-
sie's government and the massive airlift of Russian arms to the govenment of 
Mengitsu have helped successive Ethiopian governments to withstand the 
pressure of the Liberation groups in Eritrea. In Zaire, Morroccan, French and 
Belgian support proved helpful in Mobutu's counter-attacks against the invaders 
of Shaba, as did the support of the Pan-African Security Force constituted after 
the second Shaba invasion. 
The power play between the two major ideological blocs in the world has also 
tended to act as a stumbling block in the way of attempts to change domestic 
governments or structures. Where the super-powers have pitched their support 
with opposing domestic groups, as in Ethiopia-Eritrea, the tendency has been 
for the insurrection to slide into a stalemate which is often broken in favour of 
the incumbent government with its greater access to support and resilience. 
A final cause of failure of guerrilla wars directed against indigenous govern-
ments is disunity among liberation movements. In Chad, Eritrea and Zaire, the 
liberation efforts have been handicapped by the failure of the various groups to 
unite their efforts and concentrate their energies against a common foe. This 
lack of unity is most clearly demonstrated in Chad where in spite of their 
apparent success in achieving the goal of ending Southern domination of power 
in Chad both the Waddaye and Habré's factions of FROLINAT are engaged in 
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a fratricidal struggle to the detriment of their primary objective. 
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COUP AND CONSOLIDATION: 
THE SOVIET SEIZURE OF POWER IN AFGHANISTAN 
by 
David Charters 
Question: "What is the Soviet Army doing in Afghanistan?" 
Answer: "Looking for the government that invited it in." 
Overheard in a Moscow taxi 
In his foreword to Edward Luttwaks' classic study of the art and science of 
the coup d'état,1 S.E. Finer noted that more governments are changed by coup 
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